On 10 November 2026 the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) published the 2026 edition of the ‘Report on the State of Cybersecurity in the Union’. This is the biennial report that Article 18 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2) entrusts to ENISA, in cooperation with the European Commission and the NIS Cooperation Group. The overall picture is one of an improved posture, set against a threat level assessed as ‘substantial’. In our view, the most useful figure for compliance professionals is not the average but the gap between indicators. Member States are converging on national strategies and supply chain management, while information sharing, the maturity of incident response teams and certification are lagging behind.
The EU Cybersecurity Index: an average of 71.53 points
The EU Cybersecurity Index, developed by ENISA under Article 18(3) of NIS 2, measures the maturity of Member States’ cybersecurity capabilities and resources. The results are set out in the full report. According to the condensed version of the report, the EU average in 2026 is 71.53 points out of 100: twenty-two Member States fall within the ‘Mature’ posture band, two within the ‘Advanced’ band and three within the ‘Established’ band. The five highest-scoring Member States average 79.86 points, the five lowest-scoring 60.45.
The individual indicators reveal gaps that the overall figure conceals. Supply chain management practices adopted by essential and important entities score 89.91 points. By contrast, the participation of those same entities in peer-to-peer information sharing stands at 26.30 points, at the ‘Developing’ level, the second of the five on the scale, in almost every Member State. The maturity of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) stands at 54.76 points. It is among the least aligned indicators, a sign that in several Member States it is either low or has not been assessed. National certification capabilities are split between the two ends of the scale, with thirteen Member States at the ‘Foundation’ or ‘Developing’ levels and fourteen at the ‘Mature’ or ‘Advanced’ levels, giving a score of 55.56.
From rules to implementation: the cross-border problem in NIS 2
The report describes the transposition of NIS 2 as substantial but still incomplete. Risk management obligations are now generally in place. Coordination with Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector, known as the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), is also mostly established. The same applies to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, known as the Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER). The difficulty lies elsewhere. Companies operating in several Member States are exposed to differing national risk management and supervisory frameworks, in the absence of mutual recognition mechanisms. Incident reporting is further complicated by several EU acts requiring reports to different authorities. Supervision of essential and important entities is identified as one of the hardest areas to operationalise. For an individual company, the question of scope comes first, as we discussed in relation to the manufacturing undertaking that is not listed.
Supply chains, vulnerabilities and artificial intelligence
According to ENISA, a country’s cybersecurity posture is increasingly determined by the cumulative level of security and trustworthiness of the goods and services on the market, their components and the entities that use them. At the beginning of 2026 the NIS Cooperation Group adopted, for information and communication technology (ICT) supply chains, the EU ICT Supply Chain Security Toolbox. This is a common, non-binding framework for coordinated risk assessments of critical supply chains. In January 2026 the Commission proposed, as part of the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (Cybersecurity Act), a framework for trusted ICT supply chains addressing non-technical risks. Vulnerability reporting obligations are now embedded in both NIS 2 and Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act). According to the report, a delegated act is expected to establish a presumption of conformity based on the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC), as permitted by Article 27(9) of the Regulation.
According to the report, artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly acts as a multiplier of both offensive and defensive capabilities. With large-scale campaigns, a vulnerability can now be exploited within days of disclosure, and in some cases within hours or minutes. With frontier AI, again according to ENISA, discovery time will fall from days to hours. We believe this should be read together with the responsibility of management bodies, already discussed in relation to frontier AI reaching the board, and with the threat picture set out in the ENISA Threat Landscape 2026.
Crisis management: situational awareness is still incomplete
In the press release presenting the report, ENISA’s Executive Director, Juhan Lepassaar, pointed to developments in frontier AI models and to the cyber incidents affecting refrigeration systems across the EU. Both were cited as evidence of operational gaps and of the need for timely information sharing. The report sets out three related shortcomings. The 2025 EU Blueprint for Cyber Crisis Management provides a solid basis for more structured cooperation, but it has never been activated in a real-world situation. Information exchange with the private sector, which owns and operates much of the digital infrastructure, does not happen seamlessly. Finally, as already noted in 2024, there is still no common and timely EU-level picture of the situation.
Critical sectors, smaller entities and skills
Maturity in critical sectors is improving, but unevenly across sectors and within them. The gap is most marked between large organisations and smaller entities, which can be both more exposed and less prepared. The report notes that NIS 2 requirements are uniform for all essential and important entities, while the effort needed to meet them varies widely. As for people, the shortage has shifted from the number of staff to skills. As AI spreads, roles built on repetitive analysis are shrinking, while demand grows for profiles combining security expertise with AI fluency.
Conclusions
ENISA’s five directions, from effective implementation to societal resilience, translate into the policy recommendations required by Article 18(2) of NIS 2. For organisations, the most tangible finding concerns investment: 70% of organisations in critical sectors cite regulatory compliance as the main driver of cybersecurity spending. Alongside this finding, we consider it useful to set out three legal elements. Information sharing between entities remains voluntary under Article 29 of NIS 2. Since 11 September 2026 manufacturers have been subject to the obligations to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents laid down in Article 14 of the Cyber Resilience Act. Finally, Article 27(9) of the same Regulation allows the presumption of conformity to be linked to European certification schemes. If compliance is what drives investment, will voluntary participation alone be enough to close the information-sharing gap that the Index measures?
Author: Valentina Grazia Sapuppo










