Since 11 October 2026, commercial refrigeration systems and similar devices have been hit by cybersecurity incidents in several Member States. On 4 November the European Commission and four other EU bodies and networks issued a joint statement. They are the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity - ENISA, Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre - EC3, the network of national Computer Security Incident Response Teams - CSIRTs and the European cyber crisis liaison organisation network - EU-CyCLONe. In Italy, the CSIRT of the National Cybersecurity Agency - ACN has intervened several times, most recently on 20 November. Behind the technical emergency lies a precise legal question. Under EU law, the obligations fall on two distinct parties. The manufacturer of the device is addressed by Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements, known as the Cyber Resilience Act - CRA. The organisation that installs and operates the device is addressed by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union - NIS 2.
What happened
The joint statement reports a new wave of incidents on 1 and 2 November and urges organisations to act immediately to reduce the exposure of the affected systems. The CSIRT Italia bulletin of 13 October, issued after the attack on numerous French supermarket chains, describes how it worked. The attackers exploited outdated installations, administration interfaces exposed directly on the internet and weak authentication. They then remotely triggered defrost cycles and changed the operating parameters of the installations, breaking the cold chain. The bulletin was reissued on 3 and 4 November following events detected in Italy. On 4 November ACN also extended its urgent reminder to every organisation using cold chain technology, whatever its sector, and more generally to anyone using industrial remote control tools. At EU level, the CSIRTs Network gathers the national alerts of eleven bodies in a common advisory.
Unpatched vulnerabilities and end-of-life products
On 13 November CSIRT Italia reported multiple vulnerabilities in Dixell XWEB EVO systems, eight rated critical and five rated high. The vendor has declared the products end-of-life and will not release security updates. On 16 November CSIRT Italia reported six zero-day vulnerabilities in Danfoss AK-SM800A controllers, found by researchers at Midnight Blue, for which no fixes are yet available. According to the alert, exploitation could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to run code with elevated privileges and to alter temperatures, defrost cycles and alarms. The devices also lack Secure Boot, a mechanism that allows only authentic, unaltered firmware to be loaded when the device starts. This could allow access to persist even after a factory reset or a firmware update. The alerts do not link the attacks to these specific vulnerabilities. ACN warns, however, that updating firmware, changing credentials and enabling Strict Mode are not sufficient, even together, for devices directly exposed on the internet.
On 20 November CSIRT Italia reported two further critical vulnerabilities in Danfoss controllers of the AK-SC 355, AK-SM 800 and AK-SM 8xxA series. For the AK-SM 8xxA series, the manufacturer has announced a fix in the next firmware release. For the AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 series, which have been declared end-of-life, no updates will be released.
What the Cyber Resilience Act requires of the manufacturer
The joint statement expressly refers to the legal framework. Since 11 September 2026, manufacturers of products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through the single reporting platform provided for in Article 16 of the Cyber Resilience Act. The essential requirements, starting with security by design and vulnerability handling throughout the support period, will apply from 11 December 2027. For equipment already installed, the decisive provision is Article 69(3): by way of derogation from the general rule, the reporting obligations in Article 14 also apply to products placed on the market before 11 December 2027. A refrigeration controller placed on the market before 11 December 2027 therefore does not have to meet the essential requirements of the Regulation, unless it undergoes a substantial modification after that date. Its manufacturer, however, must already report any actively exploited vulnerabilities of which it becomes aware, even when the product has reached end of life. On how the platform works, see our pieces on the obligation that applied from 11 September and on the operating instructions for the platform.
What NIS 2 requires of those who operate the installations
On the user side, entities within the scope of NIS 2, transposed in Italy by Legislative Decree No 138 of 4 September 2024, must adopt cybersecurity risk management measures and report significant incidents to the national CSIRT. Among the other critical sectors, Annex II to the Directive covers the production, processing and distribution of food. However, the scope is limited to food businesses engaged in wholesale distribution and industrial production and processing. Retail is not mentioned. A supermarket chain therefore falls within scope only for its wholesale or industrial processing activities and above the size thresholds, as we saw in relation to the manufacturing undertaking that is not listed. ACN urgently asks organisations to take an inventory of their devices, remove internet exposure and separate IT networks from the networks controlling the installations. It also asks them to allow remote access for maintenance providers only through a Virtual Private Network - VPN with multi-factor authentication, to review accounts and to plan the replacement of end-of-life devices. These actions largely correspond to the risk management measures in Article 21 of the Directive, which expressly covers supply chain security and relationships with suppliers. The 13 October bulletin also states that the time frames indicated for checks and mitigation do not replace the applicable notification obligations.
Conclusions
The two frameworks allocate responsibility differently. Since 11 September 2026, the manufacturer of the controller has had to report actively exploited vulnerabilities of which it becomes aware, including for products already installed. From 11 December 2027, it will be responsible for the security of products placed on the market from that date. The organisation that installs the device is responsible, if it falls within the scope of NIS 2, for its configuration, its network exposure, its oversight of maintenance providers and incident reporting. For devices exposed on the internet, according to ACN, no update can replace the removal of that exposure. That leaves end-of-life products, already installed and without fixes, which the Cyber Resilience Act does not require anyone to fix. Does a retail operator outside the scope of NIS 2 really have any legal means to make the manufacturer secure or replace these devices?
Author: Valentina Grazia Sapuppo










