On 10 November 2026 the European Data Protection Board - EDPB published, among its national news, summaries of three fining decisions of the Italian data protection authority, the Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, concerning two cases. Read together, the two cases make the same point from different angles: a controller’s responsibility does not end with its central systems and its contracts, but extends to the point at which the business meets its customers through its distribution network. In the Wind Tre case that point is the shop; in the Poste Italiane and Deutsche Bank case it is the channel through which a loan granted by another entity is distributed.
Wind Tre: the attack came in through the shop
The proceedings arose from two personal data breach notifications submitted by the operator on 20 and 28 February 2025, concerning two similar incidents that occurred a few days apart at two separate retail outlets. As set out in decision No 348 of 14 May 2026, the attackers telephoned a member of staff at the outlet asking for remote access to the device on the pretext of technical support. Using social engineering techniques, they then obtained all the authentication factors for the web application used by the sales network. In the first incident they ran 66 targeted queries of the customer base; in the second they sent around two million requests, progressively incrementing the customer identifier, and reached the identification and contact data of 365,048 customers. For 41,359 of them, data on the registered payment method were also involved, such as IBANs, postal payment slips or partially masked credit card numbers with their expiry dates.
At its hearing the company itself stated that the credentials had presumably been stored in clear text on the desktop or retrieved from the browser. At the time, moreover, only its main application programming interfaces - APIs were protected, not the secondary ones from which the data were extracted. The Garante found that its objections had not been overcome. In the authority’s view, digital certificates and private keys should have been kept in secure solutions such as encrypted repositories, key management systems or hardware security modules. Sensitive APIs should have been protected by rate limiting and by checks that distinguish human users from automated programs - CAPTCHA. Moreover, the vulnerability assessments and penetration tests reported by the company had not covered, or had not adequately covered, the exposed APIs. Having found infringements of Article 5(1)(f) and Article 32(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 - GDPR, the authority imposed a fine of EUR 1,715,600, which the decision states is 0.04% of turnover and 1% of the statutory maximum. The mitigating factors included the measures taken after the incidents, the information given to data subjects, the absence of previous infringements, cooperation and prompt notification. The decision had been announced in Italy in the Garante’s newsletter No 549 of 16 July 2026.
No exemption for the sales network
In our view, the most significant passage concerns the distribution network itself. Wind Tre had argued that it could not impose a password management system on retail outlets it does not own, or on workers who are not its employees. The Garante rejected the argument: it is for the controller to determine the security measures it considers appropriate to the risk and to instruct its processors accordingly. The processors, for their part, must follow those instructions, irrespective of the legal nature of the relationship between the parties. In other words, the contractual structure of the network does not narrow the security measures the controller must ensure.
Accordingly, the authority ordered the company to store digital certificates in secure solutions with access controls and safeguards against unauthorised export. It also ordered the company to adopt credential management systems (password managers) for its retail outlets, ensuring secure storage, complexity and periodic rotation of passwords. Finally, it required more accurate lifecycle management of certificates and credentials, from issuance and distribution to revocation and renewal, through formalised processes and the use of key management systems or hardware security modules. The decision gave Wind Tre thirty days from notification to inform the Garante of the steps taken.
A parallel with the NIS 2 Directive
In our view, the shortcomings found and the measures ordered touch on areas that Article 21(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 - NIS 2 lists among the minimum elements of cybersecurity risk-management measures: vulnerability handling, the use of cryptography, access control and multi-factor authentication. The decision does not refer to the Directive and bases the obligations on the GDPR alone, which applies to every controller, whether or not it falls within the scope of NIS 2; moreover, it applies them not to the core of the information systems but to their commercial periphery. The point of entry, a member of staff at an outlet deceived by a fake support call, belongs to a technique that the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity - ENISA describes as still widespread, as we noted in our commentary on the ENISA Threat Landscape 2026 report.
Poste Italiane and Deutsche Bank: two independent controllers, two incomplete privacy notices
The second case stems from a complaint lodged on 5 January 2024 by a Poste Italiane employee who had applied for a loan from Deutsche Bank through the portal the bank made available to Poste’s staff. According to the complaint, when refusing the loan the bank had entered on the platform, accessible to the Poste staff handling loan applications, information on the applicant’s existing financial commitments, with the amount, and on her net income. The Garante extended the investigation of its own motion to the processing of data in the promotion and distribution of the BancoPosta product; in the meantime the complainant’s data were erased. The fines do not concern access to those data, but transparency towards data subjects.
In their agreement the two companies described themselves as independent controllers, but for the mutual exchange of data they had designated each other as processors: the bank for the parameters sent by Poste, Poste for the outcome of the assessment sent by the bank. The Garante referred to EDPB Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor, under which roles are determined by a factual rather than a formal analysis. In decision No 747, concerning Poste, it therefore concluded that in that phase too the companies act as independent controllers: Poste by virtue of its own intermediation relationship with the customer, the bank as the entity that assesses creditworthiness and decides whether to grant the loan.
The incorrect qualification carried over into the privacy notices, which should have identified the recipients or categories of recipients of the data under Article 13(1)(e) GDPR. According to the same decision No 747, Poste had defended a deliberately concise notice, citing the risk of ‘privacy fatigue’. The authority replied that conciseness and completeness are not alternative requirements, a theme we addressed when discussing comprehensibility as a condition of transparency. Having found infringements of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 13 GDPR, the Garante fined Poste Italiane EUR 48,000 by decision No 747 of 7 October 2026, taking note of the measures already adopted. By decision No 746 of the same date it fined Deutsche Bank EUR 33,000 and ordered it to draw up, within six months of notification, a privacy notice reflecting Poste’s role as an independent controller, providing documented evidence of compliance. Both decisions were announced in the Garante’s newsletter No 554 of 23 October 2026.
Conclusions
For organisations that distribute products and services through outlets they do not own, agents or intermediaries, two checks follow, in our view. The first concerns security: credentials and certificates entrusted to the external network fall within the measures that the controller must define and impose through instructions, whatever the form of the commercial relationship. Among the measures taken after the incidents, Wind Tre reported moving technical support from the telephone to an integrated chat and carrying out sample checks on retail outlets through simulated calls. The second concerns roles: the qualification of each party must be reconstructed on the basis of actual data flows and reflected in privacy notices, which must identify the recipients or categories of recipients. How many distribution networks have already mapped, in the same detail, the data protection roles across their sales channels?
Author: Valentina Grazia Sapuppo










